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Lazard Freres & Company ("Lazard") and Dillon Read & Company, Inc.
("Dillon"), the investment bank advisers to the special committee of the board
of directors of RJR Nabisco, Inc. ("RJR"), 1 moved to intervene in the recent
Nabisco shareholder litigation in the Delaware Court of Chancery.2 The motion
presented the court with the stuff of lawyers-personal jurisdiction, subject
matter jurisdiction, mandatory counterclaims, mandatory and permissive
intervention, declaratory judgments, collateral estoppel-in short, a feast for
those of our craft who are determined that the elimination of common law
pleading and antiquated bills in equity shall not spoil all the fun.3 The motion
to intervene was presented to Chancellor William T. Allen, Chief Judge of the
Delaware Court of Chancery.
What is striking about the portion of the opinion dealing with subject matter
jurisdiction is not its example of a now-rare breed of legal issues (that is, is the
declaratory judgment counterclaim, being a strictly legal matter designed to
negate liability for negligence, cognizable in a separate court of equity?), nor
even the overall issues of the modern uniqueness of the Delaware bifurcated
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structural context (that is, why not merge the courts, Delaware?). It is rather the
perspective the chancellor gives to the example:
The question of subject matter jurisdiction involves.., the Delaware specialty
of carrying forward and applying in fresh fields the ancient distinctions generated
by the law-equity split. In working in this particular area, Delaware judges bear
a particular responsibility to assist in the evolution of a workable body of rules
that permits our divided system to achieve efficiency, while maintaining the
special utility that this ancient division offers in the late 20th Century world.'
The chancellor went on to opine that, even if the proposed legal counter-
claim, a new legal theory, were being "asserted by a permissive intervenor,"
subject matter jurisdiction should be sustained.5 He reached backwards to a
traditional equitable maxim: "[I]t is the tradition of equity courts ordinarily to
take up the whole case, not parts of it."'6 But he embraced the factual emphasis
of current procedure: "[M]odern approaches to jurisdiction focus not upon the
various legal theories that can be embossed upon the facts, but upon the facts
themselves in determining what constitutes a 'cause of action' or 'claim.""
Finding that "the counterclaim appear[ed] to present a new legal theory of the
already pleaded facts," the chancellor upheld ancillary jurisdiction to hear the
proposed counterclaim: "To hold otherwise is not compelled by our statutes or
decided cases and would contribute to a wooden and unproductive jurisprudence
concerning the operation of our dual jurisdiction court system.",8
The purpose of this article is to show how a "dual jurisdiction court system"
came to be constitutionally cemented in the Delaware legal landscape and to
suggest the creative "particular responsibility" described by Chancellor Allen is
useful legal art.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR THE COURT OF
CHANCERY
In 1992, the court of chancery celebrated its 200th anniversary. Chancellor
Allen is only the nineteenth person to hold the office. While the court is
generally known for major corporate litigation,9 it is important to note that it is
a traditional court of general equity jurisdiction. General equity jurisdiction was
clearly proclaimed in Delaware's second Constitution: "The equity jurisdiction
heretofore exercised by the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas, shall be
4. In re RJR, 576 A.2d at 658.
5. Id. at 659.
6. Id. (citing 1 JOHN N. POMEROY, POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 181, 231-43 (Spencer
W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941)).
7. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENT § 24 (1982)).
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., Del. Ch., No. 10,866 (July 14, 1989)
(revised July 17, 1989), reprinted in 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 700 (1990), affd, Del. Supr., 571 A.2d 1140
(1989) (Allen, C.).
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separated from the common law jurisdiction, and vested in a Chancellor, who
shall hold Courts of Chancery in the several counties of this state .... "
Historic instincts naturally focus on the word "separated," a word connoting
change, context, and complexity. Thus, while it is cause for celebration that the
separate court of chancery has become a mature institution entering its third
century, the equity tradition in Delaware springs from a merged system, not only
during the early days of statehood (1776-1792), but also during its English
colonial period dating from the first English conquest in 1664.11 A secondary
focus is more obscure, requiring one to join an allocation of jurisdiction with
constitutional permanence, a focus on the seemingly innocuous word "vested."
One hundred and fifty-three years passed before the significance of the
constitutional creation of the separate court of chancery in 1792 was definitively
realized. During that period, the separate court embodied in the person of the
chancellor had been preserved in Delaware's third Constitution in 1831 and its
fourth Constitution in 1897. Delaware law had been largely shaped by the
distinctive character of the chancellor. From Chancellor William Killen in 1793
to Chancellor William Watson Harrington in 1945, inclusive, only twelve men
held the office. It was not until 1939 that a single statutory position of vice
chancellor was created, and his decisions were still subject to approval by the
chancellor in 1945.12
Under the original design of the Constitution of 1897, there was no
independent supreme court. Rather, the supreme court consisted of the
chancellor and the law judges on the superior court, the constitutional law court
of general jurisdiction. As the highest judicial officer, the chancellor presided.
Ironically, however, since the Constitution excluded the chancellor from the
supreme court upon an appeal from the court of chancery, the final appellate
word on equitable matters was spoken exclusively by law judges.13
A. Glanding v. Industrial Trust Co.
In the context of the original design of the Constitution of 1897, an appeal
was taken in 1944 from a court of chancery decree of distribution rendered by
10. DELAWARE CONST. of 1792, art. VII, § 14.
11. See Quillen, Historical Sketch, supra note *, at 20-126; Quillen, Equity Jurisdiction, supra note
* (providing some of the early history). See also William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short
History of the Delaware Court of Chancery, 1792-1992, in COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF
DELAWARE, 1792-1992 (1992) (published in connection with the commemoration of the court's 200th
anniversary). Since state legal history is generally an area of considerable neglect, the author has
included in this article some glimpses of Delaware history including footnote capsules of basic biographic
data of some prominent Delaware judges.
12. 42 Del. Laws ch. 148 (1939). It was not until 1949 that the position of vice chancellor became
an independently recognized constitutional office. 47 Del. Laws ch. 177 (1949). A second vice
chancellor was authorized in 1961. 53 Del. Laws ch. 5 (1961). The court now consists of five judges.
64 Del. Laws ch. 218 (1984); 67 Del. Laws ch. 1 (1989).
13. See DEL. CONST. of 1897 art. IV, §§ 13-14, in Revised Code of Delaware 1935, at xxix. The
chancellor's position as the highest judicial officer had existed since the 1792 Constitution, which directed
that he should preside over the then styled "The High Court of Errors and Appeal." DEL. CONST. of
1792, art. VII.
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the chancellor on the petition by the administrator with the will annexed. 4 The
law judges, constituting the supreme court on the appeal, themselves raised the
question of the jurisdiction of the court of chancery. This led to the landmark
Delaware case of Glanding v. Industrial Trust Co.i"
Since early colonial times, a court of special jurisdiction in estate and
guardianship matters, known as an orphans' court, had existed in Delaware. 16
The equitable nature of the court's limited jurisdiction caused some confusion
over the years as to its role in the judicial system. The situation was further
complicated by the fact that the orphans' court was staffed by the judges of the
other courts in differing forms at various periods of its existence. 7 Among
other things, the statutes governing the orphans' court gave it the authority to
enter decrees of distribution in estate matters.18
To the supreme court, this authority raised the question of the jurisdiction of
the court of chancery. Section twenty-five of the colonial Gordon Statute,19
limiting the jurisdiction of the court of chancery, had continued as part of
Delaware's statutory law ever since its enactment by the colonial assembly. In
1945, it appeared as part of the State's codified law, in the following language:
Provided, that the Chancellor shall not have power to determine any matter
wherein sufficient remedy may be had by common law, or statute, before any
other Court, or jurisdiction, of this State; but that where matters, determinable
at common law, shall be brought before him in equity, he shall remit the parties
to the common law; and when matters of fact, proper to be tried by a Jury, shall
14. Industrial Trust Co. v. Glanding, Del. Ch., 38 A.2d 752 (1944), affld, Del. Supr., 45 A.2d 553
(1945).
15. Del. Supr., 45 A.2d 553 (1945).
16. The Glanding opinion erroneously says the orphans' court was created by the statute of 1721.
Id at 557. While that statute may have been the first by the independent Lower Three County (later
Delaware) Assembly to define the jurisdiction, an orphans' court existed from the early days of William
Penn's rule. See WILLIAM H. LOYD, THE EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA ch. V, at 212-40 (1910);
COURT RECORDS OF KENT COuNTY, DELAWARE 1680-1705, KENT RECORDS, HISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION xX (Leon DeValinger, Jr. ed., 1959).
17. The relationship of the orphans' court to the court of chancery and the law courts would take
a separate paper to explore. The chancellor himself was for a long period of time, including 1897 to
1951, a judge of the orphans' court, though not originally in 1792 and not at the demise of the orphans'
court in 1970. See 56 Del. Laws ch. 147 (1967) (constitutional amendment enabling the General
Assembly to abolish the Court); 57 Del. Laws ch. 402 (1970) (abolishing the court). The court of
chancery, however, ultimately consumed the bulk of the jurisdiction of the orphans' court.
18. See 42 Del. Laws ch. 143 (1939) (now repealed 59 Del. Laws ch. 384 (1974)). The statute
granting the orphans' court such authority was formerly and most recently codified at DEL. CODE ANN.,
tit. 12, §§ 2331-2339 (1953). Now that authority lies within the court of chancery's jurisdiction. Id.
19. 1 Del. Laws ch. LIV, at 132 (circa 1727). The Gordon Statute, so named because it was enacted
during Patrick Gordon's term as Governor (1726-1736), is the single most important enactment in the
development of equity jurisdiction in Delaware. See Quillen, Equity Jurisdiction, supra note *, at 23-24,
particularly n.14. The original language of the "sufficient remedy" limitation of § 25 read as follows:
Provided also, That nothing herein contained shall give the said justices any power or
authority to hear, decree or determine in equity, any matter, cause or thing, wherein
sufficient remedy may be had in any other court or before any other magistrate or
judicature in this government, either by the rules of the common law, or according to the
tenor and directions of the law of this government, but when matters determinable at
common law shall be brought before them in equity, they shall refer or remit the parties
to the common law ....
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arise in any cause depending in Chancery, the Chancellor shall order such facts
to trial by issues at the bar of the Superior Court.'
The question in Glanding simply was whether the statutory power in the
orphans' court to enter a decree of distribution was a "sufficient remedy" to
require the chancellor to "remit the parties to the common law .... ,,21 The
five law judges divided three to two on the question with the majority upholding
the jurisdiction of the chancellor sitting in the court of chancery.
The opinion of the court was delivered by Judge Terry.22 Preliminarily, the
court focused on what jurisdiction had been vested in the court of chancery. The
majority quickly concluded without apparent difficulty, and the dissent agreed,
that the Constitutions of 1897 and 1831 did not create, but continued, the equity
jurisdiction, and that the reference in the 1792 Constitution to the "equity
jurisdiction heretofore exercised by the judges of the court of common pleas"
had to be traced back through the Constitution of 1776 to the Gordon Statute.
Under section twenty-one of the Gordon Statute, the court determined that "all
of the jurisdiction theretofore exercised by the High Court of Chancery of Great
Britain was ... conferred."'  Holding that the English Court had jurisdiction
to enter a decree of distribution "from the close of the reign of Charles II," the
first hurdle was crossed.24
The second hurdle, the old section twenty-five, divided the court. The
majority announced the following conclusions: "(1) that the Legislature in
enacting Section 25 did nothing more than declare the existence of an equitable
principle, which in fact existed without its enactment; and (2) that no positive
restriction or limitation of the exercise of equitable jurisdiction resulted
therefrom." 25 The court reached this conclusion by favoring the line of case law
holding that the "sufficiency remedy" limitation was merely "declaratory of a
limitation established from ancient times irrespective of statutes,, 26 rather than
20. REVISED CODE OF DELAWARE 1935, ch. 117, § 4367, at 922 (emphasis added). It should be
noted that both limitations in the original Gordon Statute-the restriction as to sufficient remedy at law
and the restriction as to the trial of facts--still appeared in modified form. Glanding was directed only
to the first. 45 A.2d 553.
21. See supra note 19.
22. Charles L. Terry, Jr., served the State as Secretary of State (1937-1938), Judge of the Superior
Court (1938-1957), President Judge of the Superior Court (1957-1962), Justice of the Supreme Court
(1962-1963), Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (1963-1964), and Governor (1965-1969). He died in
1970 at the age of 69. See Proceedings in Memory of the Late Honorable Charles Laymen Terry, Jr., 8
Del. Rptr. 1-19 (West 1973) (publishing supreme court proceedings in memory of Judge Terry). It is a
tribute to Terry that the most common salutation remained "Judge Terry," a fond and affectionate
remembrance of his close relationship with the trial bar and his dominant presence in the courthouse
setting.
23. Glanding, 45 A.2d at 556.
24. Id. at 555.
25. Id. at 556.
26. Id. at 557 (quoting 1 POMEROY, supra note 6, §§ 295, 344 and citing Fox v. Wharton, Del. Ch.,
5 Del. Ch. 200 (1878); Kahn v. Orenstein, Del. Ch., 114 A. 165, 167-68 (1921), rev'd on other grounds,
Del. Supr., 119 A. 444 (1922); Walker v. Caldwell, Del. Ch., 67 A. 1085 (1896); Hollis, Adm'r v. Kinney,
Del. Ch., 120 A. 356, 358 (1923)).
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the line holding that "[s]ection 25 operated as a direct and positive limitation on
the equity jurisdiction. 27
The majority elaborated on its conclusion in the following language:
It is, therefore, quite clear to us that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery
as written by implication into the constitution of 1776 is as that set forth under
Section 21 of the Act of 1726-1736 [the Gordon Statute], and Section 25 thereof
represents nothing more than a legislative direction or declaration of what would
have existed without it, and did not operate as a restriction or limitation of the
exercise of equitable jurisdiction. Therefore, the equitable jurisdiction under the
constitution of 1776 embodied that complete system of equity jurisprudence as
administered by the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain and as brought to
this country by the colonists and later enacted into the statute of 1726-1736,
subject only to the proper application of the ancient rule that equity will not
assume to exercise jurisdiction where there exists a complete and adequate
remedy at law. Although the Legislature under subsequent constitutions has
provided for additional equity jurisdiction, yet the underlying principles as
established in the constitution of 1776 have not been disturbed. The continua-
tion upon our statute books of the substance of Section 25 of the Act of 1726-
1736, now appearing under Paragraph 4367 of the present Code [REVISED CODE
OF DELAWARE 1935], does not alter in any respect our conclusion, as the
continuation of a statute containing constitutional provisions is but merely
declaratory of the constitutional provision itself and must be construed as such.
However, if necessity requires a construction of Paragraph 4367 in the light of
equitable jurisdiction aside from the constitution, we say the same in reference
thereto that we have heretofore stated regarding Section 25 of the Act of 1726-
1736. 28
The court chose a general frame of reference in English law over the more
narrow frame of reference in the colonial history of Delaware and Pennsylvania.
After tracing the statutory history, the majority returned to its original
conclusion:
It cannot be said too forcefully that the general powers of the Court of Chancery
refers to that complete system of equity as administered by the High Court of
Chancery of Great Britain, and a proper interpretation of the constitutions of
this State lead to but one conclusion; that is, that the Court of Chancery shall
continue to exercise that complete system of equity jurisdiction in all respects
until the Legislature of this State shall provide otherwise, as by granting the
exercise of a part of that jurisdiction exclusively to some other tribunal.'
The majority then recognized the argument that the remedy at law was
"adequate and complete," and, therefore, even under the ancient rule equity
would not exercise its concurrent jurisdiction. But the majority held that:
Nevertheless, there are well-recognized exceptions to this rule, and a concurrent
jurisdiction will be found to exist in many cases where the legal remedy afforded
27. Id. (citing Beeson v. Elliott, Del. Ch., 1 Del. Ch. 368, 386 (1831); Jefferson v. Tunnell, Del. Ch.,
2 Del. Ch. 135 (1847); Equitable Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Donahoe, Del. Ch., 45 A. 583 (1900)).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 558-59.
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is adequate and complete in all respects. For example, whenever the statutes
conferring the new jurisdiction upon the Law Courts are permissive only, or
whenever they not only do not contain any expressed prohibitory language, but
also do not indicate from all their provisions taken together, any clear intent to
restrict the equitable jurisdiction, that jurisdiction remains unaffected, and may
still be exercised; even though the rights protected and the remedies conferred
have by the statutes been made legal, and even though a relief ordinarily
sufficient, even amply sufficient and complete, may be obtained through the
actions at law. Of course, the effect of the statute creating the legal remedy
depends upon the legislative intent, and unless the statute shows a clear and
certain intent that the equitable jurisdiction is no longer to be exercised under
the matters within the scope of the statute, then the equitable jurisdiction has
not been abrogated.3
Primary reliance for the rationale was placed on John Norton Pomeroy's
treatise on equity jurisprudence, particularly on its position that equity
jurisdiction is not lost by the law courts' acquisition of jurisdiction over matters
once exclusively handled by equity courts.3' The majority also relied on the
specific application of this general principle to probate courts.32 With regard
to the statute that allegedly abrogated the constitutional equity jurisdiction in the
court of chancery, the court ruled, that to abrogate the court of chancery's
jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction would have had to have been expressly placed
in the orphans' court or so placed by necessary implication. Because the court
found no such intent in the "permissive or conditional jurisdiction" under the
orphans' court statute, it concluded that concurrent equity jurisdiction remained
in the court of chancery.
The majority made one interesting comment near the end of its opinion that
perhaps helps explain the result and choice of the majority on this relatively
open question:
We are not unmindful of the growing tendency on the part of Courts of other
jurisdictions to read into all legislative enactments, conferring new legal remedies
over matters theretofore reposed in equity, a legislative intention to make the
remedy at law, if adequate, exclusive. The source of our equity jurisdiction and
its development by our able Chancellors forbids us from concurring in such a
construction or interpretation of any statute conferring a new legal remedy
unless it be clear from the language employed therein that the Legislature
intended by said enactment to abrogate the pre-existing equitable jurisdiction.33
The court may well have been influenced by the fact that the chancellor had
been the chief judicial officer in the state for 153 years. Strangely, under the
original Constitution of 1897, before 1951, the orphans' court consisted of the
chancellor and the resident law judge in each county. One judge was a quorum,
although both could sit. The appeal was to the superior court, not the old
30. Id. at 559.
31. POMEROY, supra note 6, § 182.
32. 4 id. § 1153. For some unknown reason, the majority cited an earlier third edition for this point.
Glanding, 45 A.2d at 559.
33. Glanding, 45 A.2d at 560 (emphasis added).
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supreme court.3 One cannot help but think that the court pragmatically tried
to enhance the chancellor's role, given the possibility of complex questions of law
in the estate field.
The dissent, written by no less a scholar than Judge Rodney,35 did not take
issue with the constitutional grant of equity jurisdiction originating in section
twenty-one of the Gordon Statute, nor did it dispute that section twenty-five was
declaratory of a preexisting rule of equity. It balked, however, at entirely
disregarding the statute. Judge Rodney started with the proposition that the
concurrent jurisdiction of equity was based on the use of equitable remedies to
enforce legal rights, and that it was not exercised if there was an adequate
remedy at law. He then recognized that there were two views on the survival of
equity jurisdiction when law is expanded by statute to supply an adequate legal
remedy in an area of preexisting equitable jurisdiction. Under one view, the
adequate remedy provided in the statute ended the equity jurisdiction. Under
the second view, Judge Rodney acknowledged that the statute "must use words
negativing or expressly taking away the equitable jurisdiction."36  But, even
under the second view, the minority found that the continuing declaration of the
"sufficient remedy" limitation by statute, plus the new statutory grant to the
orphans' court expressly indicated a legislative intent to end equity jurisdiction.
Thus, the point of difference was narrow. Both opinions recognized that a
general equity jurisdiction of the court of chancery, coextensive with that of the
High Court of Chancery of Great Britain, became constitutionally vested in the
court of chancery in 1792. Both recognized that the traditional, adequate remedy
at law limitation applied to that constitutional jurisdiction. Both also recognized
that the adequate remedy at law restriction did not necessarily apply when legal
remedies were being expanded into areas previously occupied by equity, unless
the legislature intended to make the legal remedy exclusive. The majority found
no such intent, while the minority found a continuing declared intent existed in
the successor to section twenty-five of the Gordon Statute.37
While Glanding focused on the "sufficient remedy" limitation contained in
section twenty-five of the Gordon Statute, it also "finally settled" that the
"constitutionally prescribed jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery" was
"coextensive with the system of equity jurisdiction administered by the High
Court of Chancery of Great Britain . ".. 38 That is, while the General
Assembly can divest the court of chancery of its constitutional jurisdiction by
34. See DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. IV, §§ 13-14, in REVISED CODE OF DELAWARE 1935, at xxix.
35. Richard S. Rodney served as Judge of the Superior Court (1922-1946) and United States District
Judge (1946-1963). Judge Rodney had a keen interest in history and wrote extensively. See THE
COLLECrED ESSAYS OF RIcHARD S. RODNEY ON EARLY DELAWARE (George H. Gibson ed., 1975).
He died in 1963 at the age of 81. See also Proceedings in Memory of the Late Honorable Richard
Seymour Rodney, in 5 Del. Rptr. 1-21 (West 1971) (publishing supreme court proceedings in memory
of Judge Rodney).
36. Glanding, 45 A.2d at 566.
37. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
38. Delaware Trust Co. v. McCune, Del. Ch., 80 A.2d 507, 509 (1951), an opinion by then
Chancellor Daniel F. Wolcott. See infra note 43.
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providing a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law, such divesture does not
occur unless the General Assembly expressly states or necessarily implies that
the legal remedy is exclusive. Constitutional equity had been established.
B. Glanding's Loose Ends
Historical glimpses, by their nature, are difficult because history continues.
Glanding, in itself a rarity, is an appropriate stopping point, but stopping would
leave three important jurisdictional loose ends. Unfortunately, they cannot be
disposed of summarily. First, and foremost historically, a second round of the
Glanding battle occurred in du Pont v. du Pont,39 and, because du Pont is not
only commonly cited with, but also is essential to an understanding of Glanding,
it cannot be ignored. Second, there is the second limitation in section twenty-
five of the Gordon Statute, concerning the reference of factual issues to the law
court for a jury trial. While it has received less attention than the "sufficient
remedy" limitation, it is important to trace its origins. Third, there is a need to
generalize, to place the specific historical sketch into the general equity context.
1. du Pont v. du Pont. The du Pont case is interesting for many reasons. It
was decided in the court of chancery by Vice Chancellor Seitz on March 22,
1951.' Less than two months later, effective May 14, 1951, a major judicial
reform was effectuated by a constitutional amendment that created an
independent, three justice supreme court. 1 Thus, a new court heard the du
Pont appeal. But one judge, superior court Judge Terry, who sat in the 1945
Glanding appeal to the old supreme court, also sat in the 1951 du Pont appeal
because the newly appointed Chief Justice, Clarence A. Southerland, was
disqualified.42
In the du Pont case, a wife sued for separate maintenance. The General
Assembly had purported to give exclusive jurisdiction to the family court in a
quasi-criminal action for the support of a deserted wife in destitute circumstanc-
es. The question was whether the court of chancery retained separate
maintenance jurisdiction. In a two-to-one decision, the court upheld the
jurisdiction of the court of chancery.
The majority decision was written by Justice Wolcott,43 with Judge Terry
39. Del. Supr., 85 A.2d 724 (1951).
40. du Pont v. du Pont, Del. Ch., 79 A.2d 680 (1951). Collins J. Seitz, appointed vice-chancellor
in 1946, became the state's fourteenth chancellor in June of 1951 and served until his appointment to
the Federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in 1966. He served as Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals from 1971 to 1984. He continues to serve on senior status and recently participated in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991), the case involving the Pennsylvania abortion statute
which was recently considered by the United States Supreme Court. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
41. 48 Del. Laws, ch. 109 (1951). The three new justices took office in June 1951.
42. See DEL. CONST. OF 1897 art. IV, § 12, in 1 DEL. CODE ANN. 265 (rev. 1974) (provision
governing designation of temporary judges to the supreme court).
43. Daniel F. Wolcott had served briefly as a judge on the superior court in 1949-1950 and as the
state's thirteenth chancellor in 1950-1951, before being appointed as a justice to the new supreme court.
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joining. Interestingly, the court, on its own motion, considered first a constitu-
tional issue that had been assumed in Glanding: Could the General Assembly
"expressly deprive chancery of jurisdiction without at the same time creating a
sufficient remedy in some other tribunal"?" This question was not "technical-
ly" decided in Glanding, because the remedy afforded by the orphans' court
"was admittedly sufficient in that case. 4 5
The heart of the dispute between the majority and the minority in du Pont
focused on a constitutional provision added by the 1831 Constitution, continued
in the 1897 Constitution, granting the General Assembly "power to repeal or
alter any Act of the General Assembly giving jurisdiction to ... the Court of
Chancery, in any matter, or giving any power to either [sic] of said courts."'
The majority found this constitutional provision, which was rather sweeping
in its full language, and which had not in fact been considered in Glanding,
conferred no authorization on the General Assembly to "repeal or alter" the
portion of equity jurisdiction that had been constitutionally "vested" in the
chancellor by the Constitution of 1792, and continually "vested" in the court of
chancery by the Constitutions of 1831 and 1897. 47 The majority held that the
word "giving," in "giving jurisdiction to," referred only to jurisdiction legislatively
given since the adoption of the 1792 Constitution and distinguished such given
jurisdiction from that which was "vested" in 1792.'
The result, therefore, was the same as Glanding. The "general equity
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery [was] measured in terms of the general
equity jurisdiction of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain and [was] a
constitutional grant not subject to legislative curtailment," except as the
traditional limitation of equity-an adequate remedy of law-itself restricted in
Glanding, curtailed it.49
Newly selected Justice Tunnell wrote a blistering dissent to this majority
opinion.5 ° The dissent's reasoning was powerful and, if it had a fault, it was in
He was appointed chief justice of the supreme court in 1964 and served until his death in 1973. It is
interesting to note that his father, Josiah 0. Wolcott, had served as the state's eleventh chancellor from
1921 to 1938, and his grandfather, James L. Wolcott, had served as the state's eighth chancellor from
1892 to 1895. See Proceedings in Memory of the Late Honorable Daniel F Wolcott, 10 DEL. RPTR. 1-22
(West 1974) (publishing supreme court proceedings in memory of Chief Justice Wolcott).
44. du Pont, 85 A.2d at 727.
45. Id.
46. The language now appears in article IV, § 17 of the amended Delaware Constitution of 1897.
The use of the word "either" is questioned because several courts are listed.
47. du Pont, 85 A.2d at 729. See also DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 14. DEL. CONST. of 1831,
art. VI, § 5; DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. IV, § 10.
48. du Pont, 85 A.2d at 728-29.
49. Id. at 729.
50. James M. Tunnell, Jr., a Rhodes scholar, served on the supreme court from 1951 to 1954. He
thereafter practiced law in Wilmington as one of Delaware's most prominent lawyers with the firm of
Morris, Nichols, Arsht, and Tunnell. He was a distinguished visiting professor to the Widener University
School of Law. He ran for the United States Senate twice, losing the Democratic nomination in 1954
and losing in the general election of 1966. When Professor William Cary was noting the political ties
of Delaware judges, he listed Tunnell as having no public record. William L. Cary, Federalism and
Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 691 (1974). Justice Tunnell, in
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its overstatement. Justice Tunnell denied that the "underlying implications" of
Glanding supported the majority position,51 when clearly they did. In addition,
he spoke personally of the majority, writing "[a]s a coup de grace to this
dissent,', 52 which was clearly not the majority's intent. But, stripped of its
overstatement, Justice Tunnell's dissent gave a powerful challenge to the whole
Glanding doctrine, a challenge founded in literal constitutional language and
history. The major points given were as follows:
(1) "The 1831 constitutional convention was primarily aimed at reform
of the judiciary." There is no reason to limit the "power to repeal or
alter" given to the General Assembly.
53
(2) The 1831 Constitution only guaranteed jurisdiction to the Superior
Court, that is, general common law jurisdiction. Every other court and
the statutory jurisdiction of the Superior Court was subject to legislative
curtailment including the Court of Chancery. The absence of constitu-
tionally guaranteed general jurisdiction in an equity court was not
unusual and Pomeroy had "expressly state[d] that Delaware [was] one of
that large group of states in which equity jurisdiction may be abridged,
restricted, or modified by statute."54
(3) The distinction between "vested" and "given" was tortured,
especially given the use of the word "vested" elsewhere in the 1831
Constitution.
(4) There had always been a statute giving the Court of Chancery equity
jurisdiction as the successor to the statutory equity jurisdiction given to
the colonial Court of Common Pleas. See the current DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10, 1953 § 341. Compare the current DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 541
(1953), which expressly recognizes the constitutional jurisdiction of the
Superior Court.56
(5) The statutory "sufficient remedy" limitation was directed to the
Court of Chancery's power and not to the power of the General
Assembly. There was no basis in the statutory language to require the
new statutory remedy to be the equivalent of the Chancery remedy or to
require that the ouster be by express language.57
characteristic wit, is reputed anecdotally to have responded, "I knew we lost but I didn't think we lost
that badly." He died on January 6, 1986, at the age of 75. See Memorial Session in Honor of Justice
James M. Tunnell, Jr., 38 DEL. RPTR. xxvi-xl (West 1992) (publishing supreme court proceedings in
memory of Justice Tunnell).
51. du Pont, 85 A.2d at 740.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 735.
54. Id. at 737.
55. Id. at 738.
56. Id. at 739.
57. Id. at 738.
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(6) By transferring in 1792 the statutory equity jurisdiction "heretofore
exercised" by the Court of Common Pleas, the second Constitution did
not change its statutory nature. "By transferring the mutable, it became
immutable. Non sequitur.
''58
Justice Tunnell concluded, "[W]hether the substituted remedy is adequate or not
is entirely for the judgment of the General Assembly, and this court's views as
to its adequacy are unimportant."5 9
By definition, the majority view prevailed. Constitutional equity survived.
For reasons not pertinent to our general jurisdiction inquiry, the majority went
on to hold that the particular family court remedy was not the equivalent of a
separate maintenance action in the court of chancery. But a necessary step in
that process is generally important to our inquiry. The majority directed its
attention to whether "actions for separate maintenance were maintainable by the
wife in England prior to the separation . . ., " The majority concluded that
the Ecclesiastical Courts, in "alimony" cases, were the jurisdictional source of
independent separate maintenance actions, that is, actions for separate
maintenance not joined with any other equitable claim that would support
chancery jurisdiction. But since Delaware had not established Ecclesiastical
Courts and "[alt common law, a wife had an absolute right to be maintained by
her husband" but was without adequate means of enforcement, equity would
supply a remedy.6' The Court noted:
The result of the failure to establish Ecclesiastical Courts in Delaware was to
leave a void in the system of jurisprudence which was brought to the colonies
along with other English institutions. This being the fact, there can be little
doubt but that the ancient maxim that Equity will suffer no right to be without
a remedy would have been applied in the Courts of Equity of Delaware to give
a deserted wife separate maintenance, which she could have had in England in
the Ecclesiastical Court but could have in Delaware only in a Court of Equity.
After the passage of the Act of 1726-1736, therefore, the Courts of Equity of
Delaware had jurisdiction to award separate maintenance to a deserted wife as
a part of their original general jurisdiction growing out of the maxim that Equity
will suffer no right to be without a remedy.'
The majority added:
This maxim is the fundamental source of all general equity jurisdiction.
Whenever there exists a legal, as opposed to a purely moral right, which is either
not recognized by the law courts, or for which the remedy administered by the
law courts is inadequate, incomplete or uncertain, the maxim will be applied by
a Court of Equity in support of its jurisdiction to give relief.'
58. Id. at 739.
59. Id. at 735.
60. Id. at 730.
61. Id. at 732-33.
62. Id. at 733.
63. Id. at 733 n.20 (citing 2 POMEROY, supra note 6, § 424.
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Thus, while the court looked for the general equity powers held by the High
Court of Chancery of Great Britain "prior to the separation," it took a broad
principled view of those powers as opposed to a specific cause of action view.
The majority also had treated the case as one of first impression: "As far as can
be ascertained, the present case is the only instance of an action for separate
maintenance having been filed by a wife in the Delaware Court of Chancery. '
Thus, in 1951, the court of chancery should have entertained separate mainte-
nance jurisdiction, because "prior to the separation," the High Court of Chancery
would not have permitted a legal right to be without a remedy, even though the
English court itself did not exercise separate maintenance jurisdiction due to the
existence of an adequate remedy in the Ecclesiastical Courts.
Three brief comments about the du Pont case should be made. First,
although the supreme court was apparently unaware of the exercise of separate
maintenance jurisdiction by courts of equity of both the Lower Three Counties
in colonial times prior to 1776 and the state of Delaware prior to 1792, the result
is consistent with the eighteenth century history. In particular, Fisher v. Fisher,
a 1743 Sussex County action for separate maintenance, Robinson v. Robinson,
a 1783 Kent County action for separate maintenance, Smith v. Smith, a 1785
Sussex County action for "alimony," and Dick v. Dick, a 1791-92 New Castle
County case for separate maintenance, illustrate, and in fact actually demon-
strate, before the 1792 Chancellorship, the exercise of the equitable separate
maintenance jurisdiction, a jurisdiction that the supreme court in 1951 found
abstractly existed.65
Second, the court's reliance in du Pont on a general maxim ("equity will
suffer no right to be without a remedy") to establish equity jurisdiction is
important, because it tempers the bounds of the historical constitutional
approach. The Delaware Court of Chancery's general equity jurisdiction is not
frozen by what the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain did; it can look at
what that court would have done if it had been faced with these circumstances.
In short, the creative and innovative function of equity can operate through
historically recognized general equitable maxims.
Third, the post-du Pont result regarding the curtailment of constitutional
general equity jurisdiction by statute should be highlighted in capsule form. The
substituted statutory remedy must be adequate and exclusive. In Glanding, it
was conceded to be adequate but found not to be exclusive. In du Pont, it was
conceded to be exclusive but found not to be adequate. The two cases combine
to restrict the "sufficient remedy" limitation of the first clause of section twenty-
five of the Gordon Statute. To state it positively, the two cases support the
retention of jurisdiction in the court of chancery. This is especially true since the
64. Id. at 730.
65. See Quillen, Equity Jurisdiction, supra note *, at 25-30. For more detail, see Quillen, Historical
Sketch, supra note *, at 9, 107-10. The original case records are in the Hall of Records, Division of
Historical and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, Dover, Delaware.
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court of chancery and the supreme court (on appeal) are the constitutional
decisionmakers.
2. Section Twenty-five of the Gordon Statute. The second post-Glanding loose
end is the second limitation found in section twenty-five of the Gordon Statute:
[A]nd when matters of fact shall happen to arise upon their examination or
hearing of the matters and causes to be heard and determined in the said Court,
then and in every such case, they shall order the matter of fact to issue and trial
at the Court of Common Pleas for the proper county where the fact ariseth,
before they proceed to sentence or decree in the said Court of Equity.'
Ironically, a 1710 Pennsylvania statute originally containing this clause was
repealed in England in 1713.67 This second clause was the reason. To quote
Lord Raymond, the solicitor general:
In relation to the proceedings in equity there is a clause that they shall
determine nothing determinable at common law nor try any fact arising on
hearing the cause, but send it to an issue at law, which I apprehend must make
proceedings in equity insufferably dilatory and multiply trials at law in the plain
cases to no manner of purpose, for which reason I am humbly of opinion that
this act ought to be repealed.'
Thus, this provision was certainly not viewed in England as being declaratory
of any ancient equitable principle. Nor, due to its less noble origin and the
practical problems cited by the solicitor general, was it ever elevated in Delaware
to constitutional status, as was the "sufficient remedy" limitation. It apparently
lay quite dormant as a mere statute.69 Then it received gradually diminishing
recognition by both the General Assembly and the courts.
The Court of Errors and Appeals, then the state court of last resort, had
occasion to comment on the second clause in Waters v. Comly.7 ° The chancellor
66. 1 DEL. LAWS ch. LIV, 132.
67. The original 1681 grant of Charles II to William Penn reserved a royal power to nullify
Pennsylvania statutes. 2 BENJAMIN P. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL
CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1512 (1909). But the royal power to
nullify Pennsylvania statutes contained in the 1681 royal grant of the Province (later Pennsylvania) did
not include the Territories (later Delaware). Penn himself brought the Territories within the Province's
statutes by the 1682 Act of Union, and later placed the Territories beyond them by the permissive terms
of his 1701 Codicil, which permitted an independent Assembly in the Territories. The irony was that
Penn's Governors, whose appointment the Crown had been careful to reserve as its own, independent
of Penn, had no precise direction to forward to England for review the statutes enacted by the
independent Assembly of the Lower Three Counties (as the Territories became known). More
importantly, the Governors did not forward the colonial statutes of the Lower Three Counties, and
nullification was never exercised. Starting slowly with just two laws in 1704, which reaffirmed all
previous laws and established the representation and size of the Assembly, the new separate Assembly
quickly became an active, independent legislative body. JOHN MUNROE, COLONIAL DELAWARE 120-24
(1978).
68. 2 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 548-49 (1896), noted in LOYD, supra note 16, at 175.
69. The word "apparently" is used because it is impossible to say with any assurance, if, prior to
published cases, the clause played any role in equity practice.
70. Del. Ct. of Err. & App., 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 117 (1840).
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had refused to refer certain factual issues to the superior court. Counsel
supporting that decision argued that the chancery, as a constitutional court after
1792 and 1831, had "the common law power of English courts of equity in
sending issues, and no other," and that the decision was purely discretionary and
not subject to appeal.71 The provision of the Gordon Statute was seemingly not
applicable under this view. The other side found the right of reference "too
plain for argument" since "[tihe act of assembly [gave] a right to the issue if
asked for in proper time. 72  The Court seemed to recognize the right but
limited it:
As to the refusal of the chancellor to order certain proposed issues of fact to be
tried at the bar of the Superior Court, we are clearly of opinion, that the
provision of the act of assembly which directs it to be done, must be understood
as referring only to issues of fact which involve the merits of the case, and are
material to the decision of the cause, which we do not conceive to have been the
character of those proposed in the present instance.73
In the Revised Code of 1852, the language of the clause was altered to read
as follows: "[A]nd when matters of fact, proper to be tried by a jury, shall arise
in any cause depending in chancery, the chancellor shall order such facts to trial
by issues at the bar of the Superior Court."74 This language was continued in
the Codes of 1915 and 1935. 75
The first interpretation of the amended statutory language was made by
Chancellor Bates in Sparks v. Farmers' Bank.76 Although the statute used the
word "shall," which indicated a mandatory legislative directive to the chancellor
to submit "matters of fact proper to be tried by a jury" to trial in the superior
court, the chancellor simply said: "The application is one made to the sound
discretion of the Court. 77
If any question remained concerning the correctness of Chancellor Bates'
statutory interpretation, the matter was put to rest, prior to the 1951 court
reform constitutional amendment, by the law judges sitting as the supreme court
in Saunders v. Saunders.8 Judge Terry wrote:
Whatever import may be given to the Court's language in the Waters case,..
decided under the statute of 1792, it must be said that our Chancellors, since the
Bates decision in the Sparks case,..... under the statute of 1852, Section 4367,
Code of 1935, have consistently indicated in the very few cases presented that
71. Id. at 119.
72. Id. at 120 (emphasis in original).
73. Id. at 130. See also McDowell v. Bank of Wilmington & Brandywine, Del. Ct. of Err. & App.,
1 Del. (1 Harr.) 369, 384 (1834).
74. REv. STATUTES OF 1852, ch. 95, § 1, 1933 (Dover, Del., Samuel Kimmey 1852) (emphasis
added).
75. REVISED CODE OF DELAWARE 1915, ch. 117, 1 3844; REVISED CODE OF DELAWARE 1935, ch.
117, 1 4367.
76. Del. Ch., 3 Del. Ch. 225, 230 (1868).
77. Id.
78. Del. Supr., 71 A.2d 258, 261-62 (1950).
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the granting of an application to direct an issue to be tried by a jury at law is not
a matter of right, but falls completely within the sound discretion of the Court.
If a cause is properly in the Court of Chancery, we find no right to exist in either
party to the litigation to say that a fact necessary to be determined in the course
of the proceeding, although it may be said to be a subject for cognizance in a
Court of Law before a jury, cannot also be determined in equity without the
intervention of a jury.
To construe the second clause of Paragraph 2 of Section 4367 otherwise would
be to render it an infringement upon the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of
Equity.79
Thus, notwithstanding their common origin in the Gordon Statute, Judge Terry
suggested that the second clause could not constitutionally infringe on the
general equity jurisdiction. The deference implicit in the reference to "our
Chancellors" is also worthy of passing note.
With the 1953 Code revision, the codifiers expressly confirmed what the
Court had done. The new provision still reads as follows:
When matters of fact, proper to be tried by a jury, arise in any cause depending
in Chancery, the Court of Chancery may order such facts to trial by issues at the
Bar of the Superior Court.'
The revision note said simply: "[The w~ord 'may' was substituted for 'shall' in
order to make the ordering of facts to trial permissive rather than mandatory,
and so to conform these provisions to present practice."81
But even that does not end the matter. Long before Saunders, the court of
chancery, in Scotton v. Wright, noted that the verdict obtained when issues were
sent by it to the superior court for trial by jury was advisory only, and was not
binding on the chancellor.' While the point has not arisen directly, the Scotton
comment was accepted as law in Getty Refining & Marketing Co. v. Park Oil,
Inc.83 and tied into the present statute.84 Thus, now not only is the jury trial
reference discretionary, but the jury's verdict is only advisory. Lest anyone
question this change, Vice Chancellor Hartnett said in Getty: "The old
procedure of framing of issues by the Court of Chancery for jury trial is now
probably outmoded ....
79. Id. The reference to the "statute of 1792" is a mistake, since the statute in question is the
Gordon Statute, 1 Del. Laws, ch. LIV, and this makes some of the opinion's chronology in error. The
court's opinion also excepts the issue of land title from its general permission to try factual issues in
chancery. Dill v. Dill, Del. Ch., 91 A. 450, 452 (1914).
80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 369 (1953).
81. Id.
82. Del. Ch., 122 A. 541, 542 (1923).
83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 369 (1953).
84. Del. Ch., 385 A.2d 147, 151 (1978).
85. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 385 A.2d at 151.
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Thus, over 200 years after the enactment of the Gordon Statute, the second
clause of section twenty-five became surplusage. It is no more than the
traditional discretion of an English chancellor to have an advisory jury. It has
no force as a statutory limitation. To that extent, it is similar to the "sufficient
remedy" clause; both clauses invoke the inherent and traditional aspects of
general equity jurisdiction, but neither has a mandatory effect as a statute.
While the crucial litigation has related to section twenty-five of the Gordon
Statute, the most important consequence stems from section twenty-one and the
preliminary focus of Glanding. The Delaware Court of Chancery is constitution-
ally established as an independent court of general equity jurisdiction, with that
jurisdiction being measured by that of the High Court of Chancery of Great
Britain at the time of the separation.' This statement is not incontrovertible.
It is possible to suggest, as Justice Tunnell does effectively in his du Pont dissent,
that this constitutional jurisdiction has been made out of whole cloth. Indeed,
when one recognizes that the language of section twenty-five of the Gordon
Statute came from the 1710 Pennsylvania statute and was part of the battle
between the Governor and the Assembly in the Province over chancery
jurisdiction, it is difficult to justify the interpretations eliminating any statutory
role for the two clauses. In short, the historical context giving rise to the limiting
clauses was specific, not general, was Pennsylvania, not England, and was one of
reform, not preservation. Nor does the first state constitution lend any support
for the broad nonstatutory Glanding view.' Nonetheless, constitutional equity
is a done deal. There remains only to put a specific historical concept into a
general equity context.
3. General Equity. History has been kind to equity in Delaware. The pre-
English legal structure under the Swedes and Dutch (1636-1664) resembled
equity more than common law procedure. The early (late 1600s) and loosely
defined concept of "equity" under the English was exercised relatively
infrequently, as a post-trial or appellate corrective device. The development of
original bill in equity in the early 1700s was in the regular law courts, and was
not jurisdictionally competitive. The courts of equity, pursuant to a colonial
statute, played a particularly useful eighteenth century role in perpetuating
testimony in the very important matter of land titles. Equity was not viewed
with disfavor. Thereafter, probably for reasons unrelated to any jurisdictional
86. The separation, of course, was in 1776. From 1776 to 1792, under the Constitution of 1776, the
court of common pleas exercised equity jurisdiction expressly subject to statutory curtailment. From
1792 forward, general equity jurisdiction previously exercised by the Court of Common Pleas was
constitutionally vested in the court of chancery under article VI, § 14 of Delaware's Constitution of 1792.
It is not always clear in the cases whether the crucial date to measure the jurisdiction of the High Court
of Chancery of Great Britain is 1776 or 1792. See, e.g., Beals v. Washington Int'l, Inc., Del. Ch., 386
A.2d 1156, 1158 (1978); M.F. v. F., Del. Ch., 172 A.2d 274, 277 (1961). The date set forth in Glanding,
45 A.2d at 557, and confirmed in du Pont, 85 A.2d at 727, is 1776.
87. "The Justices of the Courts of Common Pleas and Orphans Courts shall have the power of
holding Inferior Courts of Chancery as heretofore unless the Legislature shall otherwise direct." DEL.
CONST. of 1776 art. XIII.
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need, an independent position of chancellor was created, and, at the time of
Glanding, for over 150 years, the chancellor had been the state's chief judicial
officer.88
It is worth re-emphasizing that, up until the creation of the independent
supreme court in 1951, only thirteen men had served as chancellor. In a real
sense, the chancellor was the human embodiment of the whole judicial system.
The chancellor administered general equity jurisdiction, and presided over the
court of last resort when it finally determined appeals at law. There was a very
personal presence. The office of Chancellor was the man.
Thus, the retrospective context in 1945 (at the time of Glanding) was
different from the proprietorship context in 1727 under Governor Gordon. And
the tough constitutional question was not expressly raised in Glanding. It was
not raised until the du Pont case. By that time, the die had been cast. Judge
Terry had voted, and written the majority opinion in Glanding. Justice Wolcott,
writing as chancellor in 1951, the same year du Pont was decided, had cast a vote
of his own in Delaware Trust v. McCune.89
The equity jurisdiction, so limited in its origin, but embodied in the
chancellor in 1792, had become a symbol of permanence by 1951. Justice
Wolcott absolutely clarified this point in du Pont. Constitutions were to secure
"unchangeable rights and remedies,"' three successive Constitutions intended
"to establish for the benefit of the people of the state a tribunal to administer
the remedies and principles of equity,"91 and equity jurisdiction was "remove[d]
from the vagaries of legislative whim."'  It was indeed-by a three-to-two vote
in 1945, 93 and by a two-to-one vote in 1951.' 4
III
MANIFESTATIONS OF DELAWARE'S EQUITY TRADITION
The Glanding doctrine is approaching its fiftieth birthday. There is, perhaps,
no particular reason to suppose that equity jurisdiction in the Delaware Court
of Chancery would have been altered had it rested solely on a statutory reed.
But, if we examine what has transpired in the last half-century, we cannot help
but be impressed by the unusually strong presence of a single state trial court.
If nothing can supply absolute linkage, certain manifestations, plus a dash of
88. All of these matters are discussed at some length in Quillen, Historical Sketch, supra note *,
at 1-126, and in Quillen, Equity Jurisdiction, supra note *. Particular note should be made of two
unpublished works of Michael Hanrahan, Esquire, on which the author relied heavily. See Michael
Hanrahan, Colonial Opposition to Chancery Courts (1973) and Delaware Court of Chancery: Delaware's
Peculiar Institution (1974). See, in particular, Quillen, Historical Sketch, supra note *, at 114-17.
89. Del. Ch., 80 A.2d 507 (1951).
90. 85 A.2d at 728.
91. Id. at 729.
92. Id.
93. Glanding, 45 A.2d 553.
94. du Pont, 85 A.2d 724.
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instinct, tell us that Glanding made a difference. Three manifestations of the
presence of the court of chancery stand out.
A. A National Influence
First, there is the exercise of judicial power on a national level by a state
court. This power obviously has a firm base in Delaware's continued status as
the home of corporations (over half the nation's 500 largest companies) and the
continued favor of the "internal affairs doctrine."'95 While this state of
corporate litigation has been subjected to academic criticism over the years,96
the internal affairs doctrine continues to flourish.' Thus, the focus on the court
of chancery as a forum of first instance in national corporate battles is likely to
continue, and cases like Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.9" will
continue to be litigated "home" in Delaware. This manifestation of power may
seem to some oddly provincial in a shrinking world that is becoming economical-
ly global. But, while the Delaware Court of Chancery and, on appeal, the
Supreme Court of Delaware, may be criticized as pro-management in cases such
as Paramount,"9 and as anti-management for disregarding corporate norms in
other cases such as Smith v. Van Gorkom,1° the fact is that the Delaware
courts decide such cases expeditiously within the framework of the law and let
the corporate litigants move on. Unlike so much of government, this system
works. Moreover, these decisions are genuinely controversial; good lawyers
advocate both for and against the results. One cannot imagine such an academic
debate if the forum had not aired the issues in a professional and forthright
manner.
If one seeks to evaluate judicial excellence and courage in other subject
areas, one has only to remember that one of the four cases included under
Brown v. Board of Education.1 was Gebhart v. Belton," a Delaware case.
In referring to the governing law in Gebhart, Chancellor Seitz stated:
95. The "internal affairs doctrine" is the choice of law rule that applies the law of the state of
incorporation to internal affairs lawsuits.
96. See, in particular, Cary, supra note 50, at 663; Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware
Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (1969); Note, Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the
Organization of Trusts, 33 AM. L. REV. 418 (1899). See also William S. Lerach, The Incorporation Trap:
How Delaware Has Destroyed Corporate Governance (1991) (remarks at the National Conference of
State Legislatures Annual Meeting, Orlando, Florida, Aug. 11-15, 1991).
97. Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 111 S. Ct., 1711 (1991); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
98. Del. Supr., 571 A.2d 1140 (1989).
99. See, e.g., Lerach, supra note 96, at 11-15 ("Delaware courts blessed this outrageous insult to the
owners of Time as a supposed exercise of business judgment .. "). See also Leo Herzel & Leo Katz,
Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187 (1986).
100. Del. Supr., 488 A.2d 858 (1985). See, e.g., Leo Herzel, Scott J. Davis & Dale Coiling, Smith
Brings Whip Down on Directors' Backs, LEGAL TIMES 14 (May 13, 1985) ("[T]he decision seems to
reflect nothing more but the court's need to force haphazardly chosen defendants to repent for the state
of Delaware's pro-business ways.").
101. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
102. Del. Ch., 87 A.2d 862 (1952).
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I, therefore, conclude that while State-imposed segregation in lower education
provides Negroes with inferior educational opportunities, such inferiority has not
yet been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as violating the
Fourteenth Amendment. On the contrary, it has been by implication excluded
as a Constitutional factor. It is for that Court to re-examine its doctrine in the
light of my finding of fact."u
It is interesting to note that Collins J. Seitz was thirty-seven years old on the date
of the chancery decision in Gebhart, and that a year before, as vice chancellor,
he had sat at the trial level in the du Pont case. While he was the first
chancellor not to be the state's highest judicial officer, he obviously knew that
he was not a judge of an inferior court.
B. Jurisdictional Growth
Second, the Delaware Court of Chancery presents the phenomenon of a
particular species of court, which species is commonly subsumed, and yet, in this
state, not only survives, but experiences new and expansive constitutional and
legislative recognition. This manifestation seems odd in light of the unification
movement that has had widespread support among judicial reformers, both
nationally and in Delaware. But any fair review of the last half-century
demonstrates extremely significant jurisdictional growth. Some of the growth
was particular, such as the movement of inspection of corporate stock lists, and
corporate books and records from a legal mandamus action to statutory equitable
action."° Some of the growth was judicial reform, such as the constitutional
abolition of the orphans' court and the transfer of the bulk of its former
jurisdiction to chancery, including appointments of guardians for minors and
partitions of real estate. 5 Part of the expansion is simply using the court of
chancery as an instrument to update and professionalize both substantive and
procedural law, such as the enactment of an entirely revised probate code.1"
At a 1985 seminar on Chancery Practice and Procedure, well over 100
statutory references were collected to demonstrate the statutory jurisdiction of
the court of chancery. While some of these references were traditional,1"
many simply reflect the full spectrum of the growth of law, from equal
accommodation1 °8 to hazardous waste management1 ° 9 to coastal zone protec-
103. Id. at 866. The chancellor went on to hold that the facilities were not equal and ordered
integration. The decision was affirmed on this ground. Gebhart v. Belton, Del. Supr., 91 A.2d 137
(1952). It was the defendants who took the case to the United States Supreme Court. The Delaware
case was the only one to be affirmed in Brown.
104. 56 Del. Laws ch. 50 (1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1953).
105. 57 Del. Laws ch. 402 (1970).
106. 59 Del. Laws ch. 384 (1974). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, chs. 1, 5, 9, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25 &
27.
107. For example, certain provisions of partnership law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-802, 803
(1986, 1990).
108. Id. ch. 45 (1953).
109. Id. tit. 7, § 6309 (1984).
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tionn1 to cable television franchises."' In the strange world of judicial
process, courts must grow to protect their institutional independence. Bureaucra-
cy itself is necessary, both to reflect the complexities of modem life, and to
provide the resources to compete in relation to the other branches of govern-
ment. So accepted is chancery's permanence in Delaware that these influxes of
life's necessities have gravitated to the court without any need of judicial
advocacy. The challenge to the court, now expanded to five judges, all of whom
currently are outstanding jurists, is to handle its success and to preserve the
strong singularity of its traditional identity. In the words of one commentator,
it is "the obligation of a judge to engage in a special dialogue-to listen to all
grievances, hear from all the interests affected, and give reasons for his
decisions," thus assuring "the parties that he has thoroughly participated in that
process and assumes individual responsibility for the decision. 11 2 In short, the
court, so permanently established in the body politic, has met, through growth,
the challenge of institutional survival, but now faces the challenge of maintaining
a personal judicial presence.
C. The Cultural Legacy
Third, a cultural manifestation exists concerning the court of chancery. The
judges often write with a devotional attachment to the court's history, and with
a respectful, yet zestful, reliance on equitable concepts and maxims that predate
the nation. This manifestation seems odd in a world where law is changing at
a rate that few lawyers can fathom, in a modern mode that is legislatively driven,
as distinct from common law increments, and involves substantive areas and
peculiar expertise that were nonexistent only a generation ago. In this mix, at
the least, the Glanding doctrine reinforces a heritage that carries an obligation
to history. The doctrine expressly takes us back to the core concept. The
heritage of equity is the ethical tradition of the ecclesiastical chancellors, the
tradition of equity and good conscience, complemented by the early heritage of
royal dispensation "for God and in way of charity" on the behalf of the
disadvantaged and, from the 1400s, by the particular moral persuasion involved
in the enforcement of uses."3 Equity is simply a moral sense of fairness in a
legal context. Chancellor Ellesmere, in The Earl of Oxford's Case,"4 put the
reason as being simply: "The Cause why there is a Chancery is, for that Mens
Actions are so divers and infinite, That it is impossible to make any general Law
110. Id. § 7012 (1953).
111. Id. tit. 6, § 606 (1974).
112. Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983).
113. St. Thomas More was the first lawyer chancellor (1529-1532). He succeeded Cardinal Wolsey
(1515-1529) and was described by Maitland as "the last of the great ecclesiastical Chancellors." The last
ecclesiastic was Dr. Williams, Bishop of London (1621-1625), and the last non-lawyer was Anthony
Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury (1672-1673). See FREDERIC MAITLAND, EQurrY 1-11 (1920).
114. 21 Eng. Rep. 485 (Ch. 1615).
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which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not fail in some Circum-
stances." '115
Ancient principles have modern echoes. Strict legal compliance with the
Delaware corporation statute, in changing the bylaw date of the annual meeting,
did not suffice, when the court found an inequitable manipulative purpose
designed to obstruct a dissident proxy effort. Justice (later Chief Justice)
Herrmann hit the core concept well: "[Ilnequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible.",
116
Delaware judges, sitting in chancery and in equitable appeals, frequently
place heavy reliance on traditional equitable maxims and jurisdictional concepts.
In Beals v. Washington International, Inc.,117 Vice Chancellor Hartnett, finding
no Delaware statute granting the court of chancery jurisdiction to impose
punitive damages, said it was first "necessary to ascertain whether the high court
of chancery in England had such jurisdiction in 1776. '118 After lengthy
consideration of both English and U.S. precedent, he held "that Chancery
historically and traditionally did not enforce forfeitures or penalties and that was
the rule in the high court of chancery in England in 1776 and is therefore the
rule in this Court today."' 19  It is interesting to speculate on whether the
traditional maxim-"equity abhors a forfeiture"-could play any useful role in
today's national debate over tort reform.
In Ryan v. Weiner,'20 Chancellor Allen cited Justice Story's 1835 treatise,
Commentaries on Equity Jurisdiction, a 1750 case of Lord Hardwicke, and
innumerable U.S. and English case authorities in three centuries on the subject
of unconscionable contracts. Such opinions do more than decide cases; they
remind us of who we are and, in the sense of law and constitutions, from where
we came.
As RJR Nabisco suggests, perhaps the most troublesome doctrine in
Delaware's bifurcated system comes from equity's delight "to do justice and not
by halves.' 121 In Getty Refining & Marketing Co. v. Park Oil Inc.,1 the trial
court wrestled with the jury trial considerations presented by the permissive
"equity clean-up" doctrine, and the supreme court had no difficulty confirming
the jurisdiction assumed on appeal. Indeed, Delaware law seems clear that, once
equity jurisdiction has attached, the court of chancery has jurisdiction to enter
a purely legal remedy and to enter judgment on a sole surviving purely legal
claim. 1
23
115. Id. at 486.
116. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., Del. Supr., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (1971).
117. Del. Ch., 386 A.2d 1156 (1978).
118. Id. at 1158.
119. Id. at 1159.
120. Del. Ch., 610 A.2d 1377 (1992).
121. Del. ch., 576 A.2d 654 (1990).
122. Del. Ch., 385 A.2d 147, 149-52 (1978), affd, Park Oil, Inc. v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co.,
Del. Supr., 407 A.2d 533 (1979).
123. Wilmont Homes v. Weiler, Del. Supr., 202 A.2d 576 (1964); New Castle County Volunteer
Firemen's Ass'n v. Belvedere Volunteer Fire Co., Del. Supr., 202 A.2d 800 (1964).




It could well be argued of the bifurcated system that the game is not worth
the candle. But it is reassuring to have a court dedicated to doing equity,
requiring clean hands, aiding the vigilant, doing complete justice, not suffering
a wrong to be without a remedy, giving regard to what ought to be done,
favoring substance over form, and imputing an intent to fulfill an obligation. In
an intricate world, the strength of basic morality can still be fostered well as a
separate discipline in a distinct institution.
While each separate block in these manifestations of the court can be
discussed without reference to the Glanding and du Pont cases, it is certainly
easier to take the opposite course. The case is simple. The judicially proclaimed
status of the court as a constitutionally vested, general equity court has
emboldened its judges in the exercise of power, supplied a permanence which has
enabled its structure to grow, and given a heightened cultural emphasis to
equitable maxims and principles. When one views the modem Delaware Court
of Chancery in its complete expanse, with national corporate litigation, probate
jurisdiction, supervision of trusts, guardianships for children, the infirm, and the
aged, trustees for the mentally ill, real estate partitions, innumerable special
statutory remedies, and general equity jurisdiction measured by that of the High
Court of Chancery of Great Britain at the time of separation, it is amazing how
true the current court is to the tradition of English Chancery.
Even the date 1776 may be lucky. The last century of the High Court of
Chancery in England was not its strongest. Delaware's vision of chancery is
spared the strangulation of form that became more oppressive in the 1800s,
including the English Chancellor's nineteenth century anti-egalitarian role.124
124. In the early nineteenth century, the English Court of Chancery was so burdened by the "arrears
of business" that "the time consumed in merely waiting to be heard amounted to a denial of justice."
1 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 438-39 (7th ed. 1956). Pleadings in equity
had become
so long and technically framed, with so many references and qualifications as to be scarcely
intelligible to the defendant, who [was] obliged to trust that his solicitor and counsel have, in
the voluminous document to which he deposes, accurately translated the brief and somewhat
bald notes which the solicitor took down from his mouth.
9 id. at 404 (Little, Brown 1926). Equity, and the common law as well, had become "needlessly
expensive .... " Id. at 372. The two leading chancellors at the turn of the century, Lord Edward
Thurlow (1778-1793) and Lord Eldon (John Scott) (1801-1806, 1807-1827), had manners and views that
reflected on the institution. Thurlow suffered from a "want of steady industry," "opposed a measure of
Pitt's for mitigating the horrors of the slave trade," and "lived openly with a mistress .... ." 12
HOLDSWORTH, supra at 314-27 (Methuen ed., 1938). Eldon "as Chancellor approved legislation, like the
Six Acts [a repressive code passed in 1819, see AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD HISTORY, ANCIENT,
MEDIEVAL AND MODERN, CHRONOLOGICALLY ARRANGED 605 (William L. Langer ed., 1948) for
chronology], which was designed to suppress industrial unrest and agitation for reforms." Eldon
"opposed the Act which abolished the slave trade, and he was convinced that the smallest reform in the
representative system, and the smallest concession to religious non-conformity would shake the
foundations of the constitution." 13 HOLDSWORTH, supra at 595-638, particularly 604-06 (Methuen &
Hanbury eds., 1952). Thus, while substantive equitable doctrines were systematized and even new
substantive doctrines arose, see, e.g., Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Phillips 774 (Ch. 1848) (doctrine of equitable
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In 1980, the court of chancery and, on appeal, the supreme court confronted
the ultimate life-or-death issue concerning the removal of life-support systems.
The language of the supreme court, in an opinion written by Justice Duffy,"z
a former chancellor, relates the case with grace:
Parenthetically, it is beyond dispute that, in the Delaware judicial system, no
other Court has the power, under the common law or by Statute, to grant a
"sufficient remedy" to the guardian concerning the withdrawal of life-support
systems which now sustain Mrs. Severns. The situation in which Mr. Severns
finds himself, then, is this: his wife has a constitutional right to accept or reject
medical assistance; she is unconscious and, for that reason, she cannot assert that
right; under the ruling made herein, he is the guardian of his wife's person, with
standing to assert the right which she cannot voice; there is not a Delaware
statute providing for the kind of relief he seeks; he cannot assert his wife's
constitutional right in any law Court of this State. Of course the Court of
Chancery will grant him relief under those circumstances, if he proves his right
to it. That is what equity jurisprudence has been all about since its beginnings.
The historic jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery is described in Glanding and
more recently, in Du Pont v. Du Pont,... but nothing in either of those cases
indicates that the fashioning of relief is limited to that which was available in
1776. On the contrary, the very essence of our system of equity, as Pomeroy
states in discussing its inherent power to meet social needs, is to render the
"jurisprudence as a whole adequate to the social needs .... [I]t possesses an
inherent capacity of expansion, so as to keep abreast of each succeeding
generation and age."'"
It is nice to have a court with that mission.
servitudes), there was attached to English Chancery a somewhat repressive image.
125. William Duffy has served as a judge of the superior court (1961-1962), as President Judge of
the Superior Court (1962-1966), as the state's fifteenth chancellor (1966-1973), and a justice of the
supreme court (1973-1982). He retired effective March 31, 1982. He currently serves as a Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Law at the Widener University School of Law.
126. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Ctr., Inc., Del. Supr., 421 A.2d 1334, 1347-48 (1980) (footnote
omitted) (quoting 1 POMEROY, supra note 6, § 67).
